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After steadily declining over the previous 15 years, youth smoking began to rise precipitously in
1992, and by 1997 had risenby rougMy one-third from its 1991 trough. We know very little about what
caused this time trend and what public policy can do to reverse it. This paper therefore provides a
comprehensive analysis of the impact of prices and other public policies on youth smoking in the 1990s,
drawing on three separate data sets. I find that the most important policy determinant of youth smoking,
particularly among older teens, is prices. Prices are a significant and sizeable determinant of smoking by
older teens in all tree data sets, although the estimated price elasticity varies significantly. On the other
hand, price does not appear to be an important detemiinant of smoking by younger teens. There is little
consistent evidence of robust effect of other public policies targeted to reducing youth smoking, although
there is some suggestion that restrictions on youth purchase of cigarettes reduce the quantity of cigarettes
reduce the quantity of cigarettes smoked. And I find that black youth and those with less educated parents
aie much more responsive to cigarette price than are white teens and those with more educated parents,
suggesting a strong conelation between price sensitivity and socioeconomic status.
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grubeij@mit.eduOne of the most striking trends in the behavior of youth in the U.S. during the 1990s has
been the increased incidence of smoking. After steadily declining over the previous 15 years,
youth smoking began to rise precipitously in 1992. By 1997, smoking by teenagers in the U.S.
had risen by roughly one-third from its 1991 trough. This trend is particularly striking in light of
the continuing steady decline in adult smoking in the U.S. Indeed, today we are in the
unprecedented position of having a youth smoking rate that is at least 50%higherthan the
smoking rate of adults. It is also intriguing in light of the well publicized declines in other risky
behavior among youth, notably teen pregnancy (Levine, forthcoming), and crime (Levitt and
Locirner, forthcoming).
This striking time trend has motivated substantial public policy interest in youth smoking,
highlighted by the recent unsuccessful attempt of the Clinton Administration to pass a
comprehensive tobacco regulation bill that had the ostensible main purpose of reducing youth
smoking. This public policy interest arises out of concern that youth are not appropriately
recognizing the long run implications of their smoking decisions. Indeed, young smokers clearly
underestimate the likelihood that they will still be smoking in their early 20s and beyond. For
example, among high school seniors who smoke, 56%saythat they won't be smoking 5years
later, but only 31% of them have in fact quit five years hence. Moreover, among those who
smoke more than 1 pack/day, the smoking rate five years later among those who stated that they
would not be smoking (74%) is actually higher than the smoking rate among those who stated
that they would be smoking (72%) (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1994).
If youth smoking leads to adult smoking, particularly in a manner that is underappreciated2
by the youth smokers themselves, it can have drastic implications for the health of the U.S.
population. Smoking-related illness is the leading preventable cause of death in the U.S., and
smokers on average live 6.5(males)to 5.7(females)fewer years, relative to never smokers
(Cutler et al., 1999). Thus, it is critical to understand the role that public policy can play in
detening youth smoking.
Yet, despite this concern both among public health advocates and legislators, there is
little consensus about the impact of public policy on youth smoking. There are a number of
studies which assess the responsiveness of youth smoking to prices (and thereby to taxes), but
most of the work has been cross-sectional in nature and therefore unable to disentangle price
effects from other fixed differences in smoking propensities across areas. More recent work
which has addressed this issue with repeated cross-sections or longitudinal data has produced
very mixed conclusions. There is much less work that has integrated a study of prices and other
policies. And there is no work which has explored the critical period of the 1 990s, nor which has
distinguished the price responsiveness of older and younger teens.
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the impact of prices and other public
policies on youth smoking in the 1990s. This period is of particular interest both because it is the
period of rapidly rising youth smoking, and because there is substantial variation in both state
excise taxation and other policy variables that can be exploited to study responsiveness to policy.
I do so using three different data sets with information on youth smoking: the Monitoring the
Future (MTF) survey, an in-school survey of 8th, 0th,and1 2th graders; the Youth Behavior Risk
Survey (YRBS), an in-school survey of 9-12th graders; and the Vital Statistics Natality Data,
which has data on smoking for a census of all teen mothers giving birth. By using these three3
different data sets, with complementary strengths and weaknesses, I am able to assess which
relationships with teen smoking are most robust.
The findings of this analysis are clear: the most important policy determinant of youth
smoking, particularly among older teens, is prices. Prices are a significant and sizeable
determinant of smoking by older teens in all three data sets, although the estimated price
elasticity varies significantly. On the other hand, price does not appear to be an important
determinant of smoking by younger teens. There is little consistent evidence of robust effect of
other public policies targeted to reducing youth smoking, although there is some suggestion that
restrictions on youth purchase of cigarettes reduce the quantity of cigarettes smoked. And I find
that black youth and those with less educated parents are much more responsive to cigarette price
than are white teens and those with more educated parents, suggesting a strong correlation
between price sensitivity and socioeconomic status.
The paper proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on trends in youth smoking
and on previous work in this area. Part II discusses the data and empirical framework. Part III
presents the basic findings, and explores their sensitivity to specification variation. Part IV
considers heterogeneity of impacts by race and parental education. Part V concludes.
Part I: Background
Youth Smoking: Where It 's Been, Where It's Going, and Why We Should Care
The time series trends in youth smoking are depicted in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows
the trend since the 1970s for the three available surveys of seniors: the MTF data, which has
surveyed seniors since 1976 but 8thand1 0thgradersonly since 1991; the National Health4
Interview Survey (NHIS); and the National Survey of Household Drug Abuse (N}ISDA). The
latter two surveys are household surveys, for which we use data on older teens.' There is
considerable uncertainty over the relative value of in-school vs. household surveys for collecting
smoking information; the latter have the advantage of collecting information on dropouts, but the
disadvantage that youths may be less willing to give honest answers when their parents may
overhear. Despite these differences in sources, however, all three surveys show the same basic
trend: large declines over the late 1970s, flattening and slow declines in the 1980s, and a steep
rise in the I 990s.
Figure 2 focused on the trend for the 1990s for all high school youths, using data from the
MTF and YRBS data sets that will be used for the regression analysis below. For both data sets,
there are dramatic increases in the 1990s. In the MTF data, there is an increase of 7.2 percentage
points, or 35percent;in the YRBS, the increase starts from a higher base, but the increase is
larger at 8.7 percentage points, so that the percentage increase is also about one-third.
We know remarkably little about the determinants of this increase in youth smoking over
the 1 990s. Gruber and Zinman (1999) note that changes in the background characteristics of teen
smokers can explain less than 10% of the time series trend. But it is worth noting that the time
series trend in cigarette prices is negatively conelated with youth smoking over the early part of
this period at least. As Figure 3 shows, after rising slowly for a number of years, prices fell
precipitously in the early 1990s, the result of a price war among premium brands battling a
growing generic share of the cigarette market. This corresponds in a negative way to the uptick
'In particular, for the NHIS, we use 18-19 year olds, and for the NHSDA we use 17-19
year olds through 1991, and 18-29 year olds for 1996-97.5
in smoking by high school seniors that begins in that time period. Moreover, prices rose by the
largest amount in many years in 1998 (10%), and youth smoking fell for the first time since the
beginning of the decade (by 1.4 percentage points, or 3.8%,forseniors).2 Thus, the time series
evidence is suggestive of a role of prices, but it is important to assess more carefully what role
prices are playing in driving these movements.
This dramatic upswing in youth smoking is a concern because smoking as a youth is
strongly correlated, at least in the past, with smoking as an adult. Tabulations from the 1992 and
1995 National Health Interview Surveys reveal that 42% of current or former adult smokers
started before their 16thbirthday,and 75% started before their 19thbirthday(Gruber and Zinman,
1999). Conversely, of those smoking a pack a day as high school seniors in the Monitoring the
Future survey, 87% are smoking five years later. Even among those smoking 1-5 cigarettes per
day, 70% are smoking 5 years later (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1994). If
youth smoking is a strong determinant of adult smoking, then the long run secular decline in
adult smoking may be reversed.
Of course, these facts do not prove that the current up swing in youth smoking will lead to
higher long run adult smoking rates, for two reasons. First, it is difficult to distinguish causality
from these intertemporal correlations; smoking later in life may not be a consequence of youth
smoking for adults in the past, but rather smoking at both points in life may simply arise from
intertemporal correlation in tastes for this activity. Evidence on this point is provided by Gruber
and Zinman (1999), which investigates the implications of taxes on cigarettes when individuals
2Price data from Tobacco Institute (1998). Youth smoking data from U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (1999).6
are youths on their current smoking patterns as adults. That paperfinds that higher taxes on
youths lower smoking when those youths are grown as well, suggestingthat exogenous shifts in
youth smoking can have long run impacts.
Second, however, there may also have been a structural shift in the nature of youth
smoking. Those youths who are newly taking up smoking today may be differentfrom those in
the past, and in particular more resolved to quit, and therefore this intertemporal correlation may
be broken. Once again, however, the evidence for this view does not look promising. Gruber
and Zinman (1999) examines repeated cross-sectional models of youth smoking. They do find
that smoking has become more of a "yuppie" activity among high school seniors, with smoking
increases the largest among the most advantaged groups. But these relative shifts are swamped
by the dramatic secular increases in smoking among all groups over this period: males and
females, blacks and whites, suburban and urban dwellers, and high and low GPA students are all
seeing their smoking rates rising substantially in the 1 990s. Thus, unless smokers in the 1 990s
are different only in unobservable ways, it seems likely that the rise in youth smoking will have
long run implications for the smoking rate of the adult population. It therefore becomes very
important to understand what is driving the rise in smoking in the 1990s, and what role policy
can play in reversing it.
Previous Literature on Youth Smoking
There is a substantial literature on the background characteristics of youths that are most
closely correlated with smoking decisions. This literature is reviewed in the Surgeon General's
Report of 1994, which provides a comprehensive overview of the state of knowledge to that7
point. More recent evidence on demographic correlates of smoking is provided by Gruberand
Zinman (1999). The key findings of that research are that smoking is not as purely concentrated
in disadvantaged youths as it is concentrated on low socioeconomic status adults: smoking is
much lower among minorities than among whites; it is more likely in the suburbs than in either
the city or rural areas; and it is essentially uncorrelated with parental education. On the other
hand, youth smoking is much more likely among those with worse academic performance, those
who have their own children, and those who work.
There is also a sizeable literature on the responsiveness of youth smoking to prices and
other public policies. The early work on the price elasticity of youth smoking was cross-sectional
in nature. This work generally found quite strong impacts of prices on youth smoking. While
there is some variation, a representative estimate that is frequently cited is Chaloupka and
Grossman's (1996) estimate of a participation elasticity of -0 .675 and a total smoking elasticity
of -1.313. Similar estimates are found in Lewit, Coate and Grossman (1981) and Lewit and
Coate (1982), although the result is disputed by Wasserman et al. (1991).
This literature has been strongly criticized, however, by DeCicca et al. (1998) and Evans
and Huang (1998), who point out that in cross-sectional data it is impossible to disentangle price
and policy impacts from other underlying long-run determinants of smoking attitudes. For
example, as they note, taxes are traditionally the lowest in the tobacco producing states, where
smoking is also the highest, and it is difficult to disentangle causality in that relationship. These
two papers take different approaches to solving this problem. DeCicca et al. pursue a strategy of
focusing on smoking initiation, which compares changes in smoking rates to changes in price
within a cohort, and they find no significant price impact. Evans and Huang, on the other hand,8
use repeated cross-sections of youth and include state fixed effects to control for fixed state tastes
towards smoking, and they find a significant participation price elasticity of-O.5 over the 1985-
1992 period (using repeated cross-sections of the restricted MTF data discussed below).
Both of these approaches have weaknesses. The DeCicca et a!. methodology excludes the
responsiveness of quitting to price increases; ultimately, it is the level of youth smoking that is
the concern, not just initiation. Evans and Huang do consider the overall level of smoking, but
they do not include the other controls for state smoking regulations that are deemed quite
important by DeCicca et al. Moreover, neither paper focuses on the period of most interest, the
1990s, and neither paper assesses whether their finding is robust to alternative data sets, which I
consider in detail below.
There is a smaller literature which has studied the impact of other anti-smoking policies
on youth smoking. DeCicca et a!. (1998) include in their model measures of state access
restrictions on youth tobacco purchase and of restrictions on smoking in public places, and find
no effect on smoking. Chaloupka and Grossman (1996) include a variety of measures of access
restrictions and clean air regulations; they find no (actually wrong-signed) impacts of the former,
but fairly strong negative impacts of the latter in their cross-sectional study. Another cross-
sectional study by Chaloupka and Pacula (1998) focusing on youth access restriction enforcement
does find some evidence that more tightly enforced youth access restrictions lowers youth
smoking. But these cross-sectional studies once again suffer from the fact that the legislation and
enforcement of youth access restrictions maybe correlated with fixed underlying attitudes
towards smoking. Two interesting case studies of communities that implemented tough youth
access restrictions found mixed results, with Jason et al. (1991) finding substantial (5 0%)9
declines in youth smoking in Woodridge, Illinois, while Rigotti et al. (1997) finding very limited
impacts on sales to youth and youth smoking in several Massachusetts communities.
To summarize, the literature on both prices and policies has produced somewhat mixed
conclusions, particularly the limited literature that has attempted to control for unobserved state
characteristics. Moreover, another limitation of most of the work on price responsiveness is that
it has focused on either only one cohort or one age group of teens. In fact, as I document at
length below, there is considerable heterogeneity among the teen population in their
responsiveness to policy variables.
Part II: Data and Empirical Strategy
Data Sources
The key criteria that was used in selecting data for the analysis was that information had
to be available for repeated cross-sections of teens of all ages over the 1990s. Three data sources
meet this criteria, and all three are used.3 The first, and (I argue) best, source is the Monitoring
the Future data collected through the University of Michigan. The public use version of these
data do not identify the state of residence of teens, nor are they are available for teens other than
high school seniors. I therefore purchased a restricted use sample of the data which includes
information on smoking behavior, race, age, sex, and state of residence, for 8th 10th and 12th
3A fourth data set that could have been used here is the National Survey of Household
Drug Abuse data, but this was excluded for two reasons. First, the quality of these data before
the mid 1 990s is quite suspect, due to the use of in-home surveys without computer assistance
that could suffer from bias due to parental observation; indeed, these data do not appear to show
an increase in smoking among teens through the mid-1990s, while the more respected MTF and
YRBSsurveysboth do. Second, there is no public use or even private use version of the
NSHDA data available with state identifiers; only selected researchers can access these data.10
graders, from 1991 through 1997. I focus on 1991 as the starting point for the analysis for three
reasons: first, this is the last year before teen smoking began to rise; second, this is the year in
which the 8th and 10th grade MTF data become available; and third, this is the year that the YRBS
data described next became available.
The second data source is the Youth Behavior Risk Survey data collected by the Centers
for Disease Control. A public use version of these data were newly created for this project, and
they provide information on smoking and a limited set of background characteristics for 1991,
1993, 1995 and 1997 for a sample of 9—12th graders.
The MTF and YRBS data are comparable, in that they provide nationally-representative,
in-school surveys of youth. As noted earlier with reference to Figure 2, they suggest different
levels of smoking among teens, but similar trends. The sample sizes of these surveys are also
comparable. But the MTF data has the strong advantage of being a more complete survey over
this sample period; the survey includes data on 35statesin every year from 1991 to 1997, and a
total of 277 state/year pairs over this time period. On the other hand, the YRBS is a survey that
is phasing into coverage of the entire nation, with only 10 states in the survey in every year, and
only 102 state/year pairs over this time period.4 As a result, while from 1991 to 1997 there are 59
tax changes to be studied in the MTF data, there are only 14 in the YRBS data. Thus, the results
that we obtain in the MTF are more robust to the specification check we pursue below, and we
will rely on them as our primary estimates.
The third data source is the Vital Statistics Natality Detail Files. These data are a census
4A11 of our YRBS means and estimates are weighted using weights designed to reproduce
national representativeness.11
of birth certificates for the U.S., with approximately 4 million observations per year. These data
contain information, since 1989, on the smoking behavior of the mother during pregnancy.
These smoking data appear to be of high quality; for all women, the smoking participation rate in
these data is almost exactly the same as that from a National Health Interview Survey supplement
in 1991 which provides a retrospective survey of women on their smoking while pregnant
(Gruber and Koszegi, 1999). Moreover, these data are available for virtually every state in every
year from 1991 onwards, providing even more variation than the MTF (73 tax changes over this
time period).5 But these have the disadvantage of being focused solely on one particularly select
group of teens, those having children before theirbirthday. Due to the enormous size of the
Natality data (over 300,000 teen mothers per year for our seven years of analysis), we do not
analyze micro-data on smoking rates by mothers. Rather, we group these data into
state*year*age cells, and analyze cell mean rates of smoking and conditional smoking intensity,
where the regressions are weighted by cell size.
The means for all three data sets are presented in Table 1. We consider two measures of
smoking: participation, defined as any smoking over the past month, and conditional intensity.6
The latter measure has the difficulty as a dependent variable that if there are policy impacts on
participation, there could be sample selection bias to the effects on conditional intensity; for
5Smoking data are not available for California, Indiana, and South Dakota in any year and
for New York for 199 1-93.
6In the MTF and YRBS data, conditional intensity is asked in intervals, and we use the
midpoint of each interval for intensity. In the natality data, the intensity question is continuous,
but the time frame to which the smoking question refers is unclear, as it asks about smoking
during the pregnancy. But the smoking rate for all women matches very closely the National
Health Interview Survey smoking rate calculated throughout the pregnancy, suggesting that this
question refers to the end of the pregnancy, as argued by Gruber and Koszegi (1999).12
example, if higher prices reduce smoking participation, and those who quit are low intensity
smokers, then higher prices could be associated with higher intensity among those who remain
smokers through this compositional effect.
As noted above, smoking rates are somewhat higher in the YRBS than in the MTF data
sets; for seniors over this time period, participation rates in the MTF are 31% while they are 36%
in the YRBS. Smoking rates are much lower for teen mothers; for 17-18 year old teen mothers,
the smoking rate is only 18%. However, smoking intensity is higher in the MTF survey,
averaging 7.2 cigarettes per day for seniors as compared to 6.1 cigarettes per day in the YRBS.
Intensity is even higher for teen mothers, averaging over 10 cigarettes per day for 17-18 year old
mothers. Thus, smoking among teen mothers appears less frequent, but more intense when these
women are participating. Note that this is not just a male/female difference; smoking
participation among males and females are veiy similar in the YRBS and MTF surveys, and
intensity is actually somewhat higher for males.
Smoking is less frequent, and smoking intensity is lower, for younger teens in all three
surveys. In the MTF and YRBS surveys, the full sample results are weighted more closely to the
results for younger teens, since the samples of younger teens are much larger; in the Natality
data, they are weighted towards older teens, since there are so many more births to older teens in
the data.
The key independent variables to be used in the analysis are state-level measures of
prices, taxes, and other policies. Prices as of November of each year for each state are provided
in the Tobacco Institute (1998), and a monthly series of information on taxes can be constructed
from information in that volume as well. The MTF and YRBS surveys are both conducted in the13
spring, so we use an average of the prices from November of year t-1 and November of year tas
our price measure, and the tax rate as of February as our tax measure. For the natality data, I
know the actual month of the birth, so I use the tax rate from that month of birth.
The two dimensions of anti-smoking policy that I explore are clean air regulations and
youth access restrictions. Clean air regulations, which are described in substantial detail in
Jacobson and Wasserman (1997), are laws which restrict smoking from certain public areas. I
constructed a comprehensive data base of such laws using information from the state legislative
records, Coalition on Smoking OR Health (various years) ,andthe Centers for Disease Control
web site httn:/Rww2.cdc.gov/nccdnh!osh/state/. While there are a panoply of such laws, we
categorize them into five categories: private workplace restrictions; public (e.g. state and local
government) workplace restrictions; restaurants; schools; and other (e.g. elevators, public
transportation, theaters).
Youth access restrictions are laws designed to limit youth purchases of tobacco products,
since, while youth smoking is legal, selling cigarettes to youth is not. As reviewed in Jacobson
and Wasserman (1997), states have therefore endeavored along various dimensions to
implement barriers to youth access to cigarette purchase. Categorizing these state efforts is
difficult, as there are a large number of different regulatory tools, and states enforce them with
differential rigor. I therefore rely on the expert opinion of a panel convened by the National
Cancer Institute (NCI) to evaluate state laws limiting youth access to cigarettes (Alciati, et al.,
1998) This panel considered a wide variety of state laws in this area and formed an index to
capture their overall "bite" in limiting youth access. They consider nine categories of state
regulation, and provide a score within each, which is aggregated into a total index. Their index is14
available for 1993-1996; I have followed their rules, in consultation with them, to use state laws
to extend the data back to 1991 and forward to 1997. I did augment their index by adding some
finer disaggregation of categories, and by conecting some inconsistencies with actual legislation.
I also added three additional categories that they did not consider: advertising restrictions;
licensing of retailers; and penalties on minors themselves for tobacco purchase.
I describe in more detail how this index was created in the Appendix. Appendix Table
Al also shows means for the MTF of the clean air and youth access index variable. The average
value of our access index is roughly 12 (where the maximum possible value is 26); about half of
students were subject to restrictions on smoking in private workplaces, whereas restrictions in
restaurants, government worksites, schools, and other sites were more common.
The other frequently discussed public policy intervention to reduce youth smoking is
counteradvertising. While this is a major focus of very recent discussions, over the time period
studied in this paper (ending in 1997) there was very little counteradvertising in most states.7
Empirical Strategy
For all three data sets, we pursue a similar estimation strategy, considering the impact of
prices and public policies on smoking in the following regression framework:
(1)SMOKJ =a+PRICEJ+ACCESSJL+yCLNAIR+1X1++ vT+
wherei indexes individuals; j indexes states; and t indexes years
SMOK is a measure of smoking (participation or conditional intensity)
PRICE is the price per pack of cigarettes (inclusive of taxation)
7Based on conversations with experts at the Office on Smoking and Health at the Centers
for Disease Control. The available data suggests that only a few states have major programs by
1997, and that the spending on those programs was fairly constant over our time period.15
ACCESS is the index of access restrictions
CLNAIR is a set of dummy variables for clean air regulations
X is a set of individual control variables (which varies by data set)
S is a set of state dummies
T is a set of year dummies
By including a complete set of state fixed effects, this regression surmounts any problems
with fixed differences across states in both their level of prices and the propensity to smoke, e.g.
due to tobacco production intensity. However, two potential concerns remain with the
interpretation of the price coefficient in this specification. First, if tobacco companies are doing
any state-specific pricing, then prices maybe endogenous to smoking levels. While 80% of the
variation in prices within states over time are driven by tax changes (Gruber and Koszegi, 1999),
there remains 20% that is possibly demand driven. We therefore instrument prices with the tax
rate in the state, to provide identification solely from tax-induced price movements. All
estimates presented below are from such instrumental variables models.
Second, the identifying assumption of this estimator is that within-state changes in
taxation (and other public policies) are not themselves determined by youth smoking behavior. It
is plausible that tax policy is set as a function of smoking in a state, with revenue maximizing
legislators and an inelastically demanded good. Since youths smoke only about 2% of the total
number of cigarette packs smoked annually, it is doubtful that youth smoking per se is driving
tax policy. But it is possible that youth smoking is correlated with some of the same factors that
drive adult smoking, and possibly therefore with tax setting. It is difficult with this short panel to
address this concern definitively, but we attempt to do so below.
Another important estimation issue is that we are using a large number of observations in
each of these data sets, but we really only have variation in our key variables across state and16
year cells. As a result, all regressions are estimated with the standard errors corrected for within
state-year cell correlations in the error terms.
Part III: Results
MTF Data -Seniors
I begin the analysis by focusing on the MTF data, which as discussed above is the highest
quality source of nationally representative data. I also start with seniors, to parallel most
previous work in this area.
The results of estimating equation (1) for high school seniors are presented in the first
two colunms of Table 2. The most important finding is that there is a negative and statistically
significant impact of prices on smoking participation. The implied elasticity at the sample mean
is -0.67. The impact on conditional intensity is negative, but insignificant, implying a small
elasticity of conditional intensity of -0.06. As noted earlier, it is difficult to interpret these
estimates as the pooi of smokers is changing. In particular, it seems likely that those who quit
smoking as the price rises have the lowest ex-ante intensity, which would lead to a positive
compositional bias to the estimates.
I obtain much less convincing evidence for the role of other policies, however. There is a
negative impact of access restrictions on the quantity of cigarettes smoked, but the coefficient is
not significant. The only clean air restrictions for which there are significant negative effects are
for restrictions on government workplaces (in terms of conditional quantity smoked) and for
restrictions on other sites (for both participation and quantity smoked). It seems highly unlikely
that there is a true causal impact of restrictions in government worksites on youth; it is perhaps17
more plausible that restrictions on other sites such as public transportation might matter.
Does this significant price impact suggest that we can explain the time series movements
by the price decline of the early 1 990s? From 1991 through 1997, the price of cigarettes fell by
14 cents. At our estimated coefficient on participation, this explains 30% of the 7.2 percentage
point rise in smoking over this time period. Thus, price is playing an important role, but not the
dominant one.
MTF Data -YoungerTeens
The next four columns of Table 2 investigate the impact of prices and policies on younger
smokers (8thand1 0thgraders).Interestingly, there is little impact of price on the smoking of
younger teens. The coefficients on both participation and intensity are insignificant for 8-10th
graders, and as a result for the full sample of 8-12th graders. Over the full sample, the price
elasticity for participation is only -0.31, with a conditional intensity elasticity of -0.03. This casts
further doubt on the role of price as the primary determinant of the time series trend, since the
trends in smoking are quite similar for 8-10th graders and for seniors.
The impacts of other policies on the smoking of 8-10th graders is more interesting than
for seniors. We now estimate a highly significant impact of youth access restrictions on the
conditional quantity of cigarettes consumed by younger teens, which is not subject to selection
bias due to the insignificant impacts on participation. This coefficient suggests that moving
from the lowest to the highest value of this index would lower smoking intensity by 1.38
cigarettes per day, or 25%. This is interesting because it is indeed possible that access
restrictions, by raising the hassle costs of obtaining cigarettes, do not deter youths from smoking18
at all, but rather limit the extent to which they do smoke. We also again obtain negative impacts
of government worksite restrictions on smoking intensity, and negative impacts of other clean air
restrictions on both intensity and participation.
There is a paucity of control variables available in these restricted MTF data. We do find
that smoking rises with grade. The age variables are defined only conditional on grade (due to
data restrictions in these MTF data), but they have the expected pattern: older children within
each grade smoke more. Non-white youths are much less likely to smoke, and there is a positive
effect of being male among seniors, but a negative effect among 8th and 10th graders, so that for
the full sample the effect is insignificant. Gruber and Zinman (1999) find that the positive
impact of being male for the seniors becomes negative when other covariates available in the
public use data are included.
re, a key advantage of my analytic strategy is that I have brought
:his question, in order to analyze the most consistent patterns of
smoking. In this spirit, Tables 3 and 4 replicate the results for the
Natality data, once again for older teens (seniors in the YRBS; 17-18
a), younger teens (9-11th graders in YRBS; 13-16 year olds in
consistent finding across all three data sets is the negative impact of
teens. In the YRBS, the elasticities are enormous: there is an
ation,an elasticity of-1.5 on conditional intensity. In the
YRBS and Natality Data
As emphasized abo'
several data sets to bear on
impacts of public policy on
MTF data in the YRBS and
year olds in the Natality dat
Natality data), and overall.
The most strikingly
prices on smoking by older
elasticity of -1.5 on partici19
Natality data, the elasticities are more modest, with an elasticity of participation of -0.38 and an
elasticity of conditional inteisity of -0.15. It is perhaps not surprising that the elasticity is
smaller for teen mothers thaii for other groups, given that the very fact that these women are
smoking reveals their insensitivity of the smoking decision to information about the hazards for
newborns. This smaller elasticity is not due to the gender composition of the sample. In both the
MTF and YRBSdata,we estimate very similar elasticities for males and females; the elasticities
are somewhat higher for males in the MTF and somewhat higher for females in the YRBS.
Moreover, there is a consistent finding of a much smaller impact of prices on young
smokers. In the YRBS data, the elasticity of participation is wrong-signed, and the elasticity of
conditional intensity is insigiificant, for 9-1 lth graders. In the Natality data, both coefficients
are right-signed, but insignificant.
Why might we be finding that older teens are more price sensitive? There are several
possible explanations. One is that smoking means different things at different ages. Younger
teens may view participation as pure experimentation, which is less well described by economists
models of addictions, such as Becker and Murphy (1988), and which is as a result less sensitive
to economic factors such as price. But by the time these youths have become seniors they have
completed their experimentation phase, and smoking follows expected relationships with price
and other economic factors. This type of story is consistent with the fact that younger teens who
smoke consume a smaller quantity of cigarettes, and with the evidence below that the
demographic correlates of socioeconomic disadvantage (race and parental education) lead to
higher price sensitivity for seniors, but not for younger teens.
Alternatively, younger teens may be pursuing smoking as a mode of acceptance into a20
peer group, and by the time they are seniors they have been accepted into the group. If smoking
as a younger teen regardless of price is required to gain acceptance to a peer group, but once
within the group peer effects have their usual multiplier impact on price elasticities, then this
would yield low price elasticities on younger teens and higher ones on older teens. Finally, it
may simply be that teens using their own money are more price elastic than are those who rely on
money from parents (obtaind either complicitly or illicitly).
In contrast to the robust and significant impact of prices on youth smoking, however, we
obtain much more mixed evidence on a role for other public policies. There is no public policy
variable other than price which is significant for either age group in all three data sets, or even in
both the data sets
representiiig
the full teen population (MTF and YRBS). The most robust
finding appears to be fortheimpact of youth access restrictions on the quantity of cigarettes
smoked, which is negative for both younger teens and seniors, and significant for the latter, in the
Natality data; the magnitudes of the effects for teen mothers are much smaller than for all teens
in the MTF. We also find negative impacts of clean air regulations for restaurants (which are
significant for participation by seniors in the Natality and YRBS data), and of clean air
regulations for other sites such as public transportation (which are highly significant in the MTF,
and are negative and marginally significant for younger teen participation in the Natality data).
The coefficients on the covariates in the YRBS generally conform to expectations. There
is little impact of sex, and a enormous negative impact of race, on smoking rates. Smoking
rates fall with grade, conditional on age, but rise strongly with age, so that on average smoking is
rising with grade as well. Echoing the findings of Gruber and Zinman (1999) using MTF
microdata, there is little impact of parental education on smoking, at least for seniors; there is21
some evidence that having more educated parents leads to less smoking for 8thand1 Øth graders.8
There are very few covariates in the Natality data, but they do confirm that smoking rises with
age and is much higher for'hites.One interesting difference between the Natality and YRBS
data sets is that smoking among hispanics is much lower in the Natality data, but is only
marginally lower in the YRS. Unfortunately, due to the restricted nature of the MTF data, we
can't bring that evidence to 'ii,ear on racial distinctions; we only know whether the youth is white
or non-white in those data.
In summary, there are four conclusions from these basic results. First, there is a sizeable
and significant negative impkct of price on smoking by seniors, particularly for the decision to
participate. This finding is robust to all three data sets. I estimate elasticities that range from -
0.38(Natality) to -1.5 (YRBS), but the most reliable estimate is probably the elasticity of -0.66
from the MTF data. Second, however, I find that there is no impact of price on younger teens, so
that in aggregate the price impacts on teen smoking are weak, with overall price elasticities for
teens ranging from -0.13 (Y1BS) to -0.35 (Natality). Third, there is some suggestion that laws
which restrict youth access to tobacco products reduce the intensity of youth smoking, but not
smoking participation. Finally, there is little consistent evidence that clean air restrictions matter
for youth smoking decisions.
8Parental educationi not available in the 1991 YRBS, and is missing for a number of
respondents in other years, s the omitted category here is parents who are either high school
dropouts or for whom education is missing.
9Note that the covariates here are cell means, e.g. percent white in the age/year/state cell.22
Specflcation Tests
There are two potential concerns about this exercise that must be addressed. The first is
that, for two of our three data sets, we only have data on students, and not high school dropouts.
This may lead to a biased estimate of the aggregate teen elasticity, if dropouts are differentially
price sensitive; but since the quoted statistics on teen smoking come from the in-school surveys
used here, these are the relevant data for trying to explain time trends. More perniciously,
however, if high school dropout rates are somehow conelated with tobacco taxation, then there
could be a sample selection bias to our estimates. For example, it is plausible that increased
tobacco taxes maybe associated with more dropping out of high quantity smokers, leading to a
fall in the in-school measured participation rate and smoking intensity. While the price of
cigarettes is unlikely to be a major determinant of the dropout decision, some relationship of this
type could bias our estimates.
We addressed this concern by collecting data on state by year dropout rates and
controlling for them in our regression framework. These data were computed from the October
CPS, as the share of students who are enrolled in school at age 17 or 18 but were not enrolled
when they were age 16 or 17 in the previous year; we use three year rolling averages for each
state and year to increase precision.'° The results of including these controls are shown in the
first panel of Table 5, for the MTF and YRBSsamples;we show the coefficients on price and on
these controls. In no case does including these control variables change much our coefficient on
price, nor did the variables themselves enter significantly in our regressions. So this suggests no
10We have also experimented with using the share of 19 and 20 year olds who are not
high school graduates in a state/year; the results were similar. We are grateful to Thomas
Lemeiux for compiling these data for us.23
bias from selection on who remains in school as taxes change.
Another more serious concern, mentioned earlier, is that excise taxes may be endogenous,
if not directly to youth smoking, then to aggregate cigarette consumption, which may in turn be
correlated with youth smoking decisions (either positively, through adult peer effects, or
negatively, through teen contrariness). This general endogeneity concern is impossible to address
perfectly, in particular given the very short panel of data with which we are working. But we can
address the specific concern that our finding is driven by an omitted correlation of youth and
adult smoking by including directly in the regression a control for aggregate cigarette
consumption in that state in the previous year. If taxes are responding negatively to aggregate
cigarette demand, and this demand is in turn positively correlated with youth smoking, then
including lagged packs will remove our finding of a sizeable price elasticity.
The results of this specification test are shown in Table 6, where we present the results
from regressions that include in our basic specification (1) the lagged value of packs per capita in
that state, from Tobacco Institute (1998). We show the coefficient on price and on lagged packs.
In the MTF, the coefficient for seniors is virtually unchanged, and the coefficient for younger
teens rises. The YRBS results are more sensitive, perhaps reflecting the fact that there so many
fewer tax change "events" in these data, and the price term is now only statistically significant at
the 8% level for seniors, but the elasticity remains quite large (-1.194). The Natality coefficients
are unchanged. We have also experimented with including not just lagged aggregate sales, but
also current sales, twice lagged sales, and thrice lagged sales. We find once again that these
expanded controls lead to a weakening of the YRBS result similar to that shown in Table 6, and
actually to a modest increase in the estimated MTF elasticity. The coefficients on lagged24
packs/capita themselves are generally insignificant. Thus, it appears that correlations between
aggregate consumption and both tax setting and youth smoking caimot explain our findings.
Part IV: Heterogeneity
The analysis thus far has considered youth smoking as a simple aggregate, and has not
explored the heterogeneity in policy impacts across different groups of youth. But there are
considerable differences across youth in their underlying propensity to smoke. Most noticeable
is racial differences, and the YRBS suggests some differences by parental education as well, at
least for younger teens. In this section we explore the heterogeneity in the price responsiveness
of youth smokers. In particular, we assess whether socioeconomically disadvantaged youth are
more responsive to prices, suggesting a cross-elasticity between price and income.
The results for a racial decomposition of smoking responsiveness are presented in Table
7. For the MTF sample, we can only compare white and non-white youths, since this is the only
racial distinction available in these restricted data. In the YRBS and Natality data, we can
compare white and black youths more specifically. When we have estimated models for whites
and all non-whites in these other data sets, they are similar but more muted than the results for
whites and blacks.
The results for the MTF and YRBS data for seniors are striking: there is much higher
price responsiveness among blacks than among whites. In the MTF, the price elasticity of
participation for white seniors is only -0.35,andis insignificant, and there is a positive
coefficient on conditional intensity. But for black seniors the elasticity of participation is an
enormous and statistically significant -2.32, and there is a significant elasticity of conditional25
intensityof -2.03 as well. In the YRBS, the results are even more extreme, with an elasticity of-
0.63 for white smoking participation and an unreasonable elasticity of —9.3 for blacks. In the
Natality data, on the other hand, the results are reversed: the price elasticity for whites is slightly
larger than for the full sample, and there is no price responsiveness of participation among blacks
(although there is a large negative impact on conditional intensity).
For younger teens, there is a much less clear racial pattern. There are no significant
elasticities for either whites or blacks in the MTF or YRBSdata.For the natality data, the
elasticities are once again significant for whites and wrong-signed for blacks.
One explanation for this higher price sensitivity among black youths is lower incomes. A
number of articles have found for adult smokers price elasticities that fall with income (e.g.
Evans et al. 1999). If the same is true for teens, then the lower incomes of black seniors may
explain their increased responsiveness. Unfortunately, none of these data sets contain
information on income. But the YRBS data do have an excellent proxy for permanent income:
parental education.
In the final panel of Table 7 I therefore present results which divide the YRBS sample
into those whose mother and father are high school dropouts or graduates, and those whose
mother and father have some college or are college graduates. There is a striking difference
across these groups for seniors: the elasticity of participation is -4.4 for the low education group,
and is only -0.2 for the high education group (and is highly insignificant for the latter). This is
offset to some extent by a very large conditional intensity elasticity for the high education group.
But, overall, there is a clear negative correlation of price responsiveness and socioeconomic
status measured this way. Once again, however, there is no clear relationship for younger teens;26
the elasticity of participation is actually positive and significant for younger teens with less
educated parents, and is positive and insignificant for younger teens with more highly educated
parents.
Taken together, the results in Table 7 suggest two important conclusions. First, for
seniors, there is a strong cross-elasticity between price and incomes. Lower income groups,
either racially or by parental education, are much more price sensitive. Moreover, the fact that
the results by race for teen mothers are reversed is consistent with the fact that, while white teens
are much more advantaged than black teens as a whole, among teen mothers blacks actually have
a higher median income.11
Second, there continues to be evidence that the smoking decisions of younger teens are
determined primarily by non-economic factors. Not only are younger teens not price sensitive,
there is no pattern of increased relative sensitivity with income, as proxied by either race or
parental education.
Part V: Conclusions
The 1 990s is a decade that has seen remarkable progress on important indicators of risky
teen behavior, such as teen births and crime by youths. But a striking countervailing trend is the
increased incidence of smoking by teenagers, which rose by a third from 1991 through 1997.
This trend has potentially troubling public health implications if youth smoking leads to adult
smoking. Yet we know very little about what caused this dramatic shift, and what role public
"Specifically, in 1997, median family income for white teens was $47,000, while it was
only $25,000 for black teens. At the same time, among white teen mothers median income was
$3000, while it was $4300 among black teen mothers.27
policy can play in reversing it.
The results in this paper suggest that the single greatest policy determinant of youth
smoking is the price of cigarettes. I consistently find across several data sets that older teens are
very sensitive to the price of cigarettes, with a central price elasticity estimate of-0.67. This
estimate implies that the sharp reduction in cigarette prices in the early 1 990s can explain
roughly 30% of the increase in smoking over the subsequent six years. Moreover, this price
sensitivity rises for more socioeconomically disadvantaged groups such as blacks or those with
less educated parents.
At the same time, I find that younger teens are not sensitive to prices on average, nor is
there any relationship between price sensitivity and socioeconomic status for younger teens.
These findings suggest important heterogeneity in the teen population. Younger teens appear to
be price insensitive experimenters who evolve into more price sensitive smokers by their older
teen years. An important priority for future work in this area is to understand the evolution of
smoking between the younger teen and older teenage years.
These findings also hold out little hope for other policies as a means of reducing youth
smoking. I do find some evidence that policies that restrict the access of youth to cigarettes
reduce the quantity of cigarettes smoked by those youth, but this finding is not nearly as robust as
the price relationship. There is no consistent evidence that restrictions on smoking in public
places lowers smoking.
Overall, these results imply that policy makers concerned about the rise in youth smoking
should look to raising cigarette taxes as the most effective means of reducing that smoking. Of
course, with youths only smoking about 2% of cigarette packs, taxes are a very blunt instrument28
to address youth smoking issues. Thus, there are a host of additional issues that must be
considered in deriving the optimal cigarette tax beyond considerations of youth smoking;
Chaloupka and Warner (1999), Evans et al. (1999) and Gruber and Koszegi (1999) provide
further discussions of these factors. But the results here suggest that consideration of optimal
cigarette tax policy must include the very strong effect that taxes have on smoking by older teens.29
Appendix: Youth Access Index
Our Youth Access Index (YAI) is based upon the National Cancer Institute's (NCI)
Decision Criteria For Rating State Youth Access Laws. The NCI's Criteria include nine
categories: minimum age of purchase; packaging; clerk intervention; photo identification;
vending machine availability; free distribution; graduated penalties; random inspections; and
statewide enforcement. For each category, a score is granted on a scale of 1-4 or 1-5 as a
function of the stringency of state regulation in that area. For example, states get a score of 0 if
the minimum age is below 18; a score of 3 if the minimum age is 18 but there is no requirement
of sign posting and/or there is no specific penalty for failure to post a sign; a score of 4 if the
minimum age is 18 with specific sign posting requirements and penalties for failure to post; and
a score of 5 if there is a minimum age above age 18 and there are posting/penalty provisions.
These points are then summed across categories to get a total access index score. Then, states
points are reduced by two points (to a minimum of zero) if they allow their state regulation to
preempt a stricter local ordinance.
While the general framework of the two indexes is the same, the YAT contains several
variations in order to describe state tobacco laws in more detail. The largest difference is the
inclusion of three categories in addition to the nine utilized by the NCI. These were Advertising,
Licensing, and Restrictions on Minors. Points are awarded for advertising restrictions on a scale
between one and four. A state earns one point for minimal limitations (no advertising on school
buses, etc.) and four points for a ban on all tobacco advertisements. Including licensing in the
YAI captures the extent to which retailers, vendors, and wholesalers are regulated by state
agencies. Maximum licensing requirements (applicable to retailers, vendors, and wholesalers)30
received four points while states mandating only wholesale licenses received one point. The
Restrictions on Minors category encompasses laws relating to underage purchase, possession,
and use of tobacco. Those states outlawing these actions, but implementing no penalties for
violating the laws received between zero and one point. The highest possible score, four points,
is given to states outlawing purchase, possession, and use and implementing graduated penalties.
The YAIalsoallows for more point levels under each category than the NCI index, to
create a finer gradation between the stringency of various laws. For example, one problem with
the minimum age categorization noted above is that some states mandate signage at the point of
purchase, while others mandate signage but not at the point of purchase; we awarded the latter
group of states 3.5pointsinstead of 4. This affected twenty-one states overall. Similar half
point steps were added to each the nine original NCI categories. The purpose of this variation
from the NCI index was to distinguish more clearly between the stringency of varying state
requirements.
We also in several instances altered scoring decisions made by the NCI in the final
computation of state scores. After extensive investigation of state laws and statutes, several
inconsistencies were discovered between the laws and the NCI point allotment. For example,
upon consultation with NCI representatives, it was revealed that Connecticut received two points
for the vending machine category in 1996. The justification for this score was that a 1996 law
added new restrictions. However, certain sections were not effective until after the time period
of the NCI study. Since the law had already passed, though, NCI awarded points to reflect it in
their study. For this project, however, this point assignment was inappropriate. Credit for laws
was only awarded after the law came into effect. Therefore, the YAIcontainsseveral31
modifications to the factual basis of the NCI index.References
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 Table 1: Means of MTF, YRBS, and Natality Price Regression Samples




Monitoring the Future Data -1991-97
12t Grade 0.309 7.21 1.39
(N=91,567) (0.462) (8.87) (0.17)
0.21
(0.10)
8-10th grade 0.217 5.42 1.38
(N=213,527) (0.412) (8.38) (0.17)
0.21
(0.10)
8-12th Grade 0.246 6.13 1.39
(N=336,665) (0.431) (8.63) (0.17)
0.21
(0.10)
Youth Risk Behavior Survey Data -1991,1993,1995,1997
12th Grade 0.358 6.06 1.28
(N=14,346) (0.479) (6.13) (0.15)
0.21
(0.10)
9-llthGrade 0.315 5.15 1.28
(N=38,932) (0.464) (5.70) (0.15)
0.21
(0.10)
9-12th Grade 0.326 5.42 1.28




17-18 Years Old 0.180 10.23 1.23
(N=666) (0.075) (1.31) (0.14)
0.19
(0.10)
13-16 Years Old 0.127 9.21 1.22
(N=1319) (0.071) (1.70) (0.14)
0.19
(0.10)
13-18 Years Old 0.164 9.93 1.22
(N= 1985) (0.078) (1.51) (0.14)
0.19
(0.10)
Notes: Author's tabulations of MTF, YRBS, and Natality data. All prices and taxes in 1982
dollars. Micro-data for MTF and YRBS; cell-level data for Natality, as described in text, with
means weighted by cell count. Cigs/day when smoke is cigarettes per day smoked on days when
smoking. Standard deviations in parentheses.Table 2: Impact of Price and Regulations on Youth Smoking in MTF Data
12"' Graders th &10"' Graders 8th - 12th Graders





















































































































































































106539 32868 230126 49927 336665 82795
Notes: Estimates from regressions in MTF data, as described in text. Standard errors (corrected for
state/year clustering) in parentheses. All regressions also include full set of state and year fixed effects.Table 3: Impact of Price and Regulations on Youth Smoking in YRBS Data
2 Graders 9th - Graders


















































































































































































Age 16 -0.044 -14.86 0.146 1.39 0.146 1.36
(0.161) (4.93) (0.016) (0.443) (0.016) (0.444)Age 17 -0.106 -15.50 0.191 2.28 0.191 2.13
(0.145) (4.62) (0.020) (0.542) (0.020) (0.544)
Age 18 -0.086 -14.95 0.244 2.71 0.218 2.53
(0.144) (4.66) (0.035) (0.772) (0.023) (0.618)
Dad Educ 0.014 -0.349 -0.007 -0.384 -0.002 -0.362
HS Grad (0.022) (0.431) (0.015) (0.252) (0.012) (0.215)
DadEduc 0.008 -1.07 -0.035 -0.488 -0.025 -0.660
Some Coil (0.027) (0.549) (0.0 18) (0.4 10) (0.0 14) (0.332)
Dad Educ -0.004 -1.26 -0.055 -0.905 -0.042 -0.971
Coil Grad (0.024) (0.493) (0.0 19) (0.305) (0.0 15) (0.232)
Mom Ed -0.058 -0.701 -0.014 -0.640 -0.027 -0.686
HS Grad (0.024) (0.403) (0.017) (0.416) (0.015) (0.339)
Mom Ed -0.031 -0.382 -0.030 -0.935 -0.030 -0.751
Some Coil (0.030) (0.508) (0.0 13) (0.429) (0.0 15) (0.326)
Mom Ed -0.044 -0.785 -0.038 -0.908 -0.041 -0.891
Coil Grad (0.027) (0.446) (0.017) (0.423) (0.015) (0.338)
Number 14346 4429 38932 11368 53278 15797
Ohs
Notes: Estimates from regressions in YRBSdata,as describedin text. Standard errors (corrected for
state/yearclustering) in parentheses. All regressions also include full set of state and year fixed effects.Table 4: Impact of Price and Regulations on Youth Smoking in Natality Data
17-18 Year Olds 13-16 Year Olds 13-18 Year Olds













































































































































































1319 1189 666 666 1985 1855
Notes: Estimates from regressions in Natality data, as described in text. Standarderrors (corrected for
state/year clustering) in parentheses. All regressions also include full set of state andyear fixed effects.Table 5: Impact of Price and Regulations with Dropout Control -SeniorsOnly
MTF Data YRBS Data
Partic. Cigs/Day Partic. Cigs/Day
Price -0.136 -0.894 -0.446 -7.736
(0.082) (2.512) (0.199) (3.673)
[-0.612] [-0.172] [-1.534] [-1.634]
Access 0.077 -3.12 -0.037 1.360
Jndex!100 (0.106) (2.71) (0.172) (3.765)
Private -0.040 0.380 0.006 -2.615
Work (0.028) (0.584) (0.047) (1.768)
Gov't 0.022 -1.138 -0.077 -0.265
Work (0.026) (0.508) (0.031) (1.465)
Rest. 0.039 1.896 -0.176 -1.718
(0.030) (0.807) (0.030) (1.184)
Schools 0.047 1.106 0.012 -0.451
(0.031) (0.940) (0.061) (1.171)
Other -0.087 -2.502 0.033 6.557
(0.039) (1.245) (0.069) (1.967)
Dropout 0.135 -6.570 -0.447 -13.27
Rate (0.115) (4.431) (0.454) (7.282)
Notes: Estimates from regressions in MTF data (first two columns) and YRBSdata(last two columns).
Standard errors (corrected for state/year clustering) in parentheses; price elasticity insquare brackets.
All regressions include full set of state and year fixed effects, as well as control variables shown in
Tables 2 and 3.Table 6: Price Coefficient with Lagged Packs/Capita
OlderTeens Younger Teens All Teens



































































































Notes: Coefficient on price and lagged packs/capita from regressions in MTF (first panel), YRBS
(secondpanel), and Natality data (third panel). Regressions include all of the controls shown in Tables
2, 3, and 4, including full set of state and year fixed effects. Standard errors (corrected for state/year
clustering) in parentheses; price elasticity in square brackets.OlderTeens Younger Teens All Teens












































































Mom&Dad -1.266 -2.036 0.79 10.806
HS Drop (0.583) (8.497) (0.369) (5.889)
4.464
or Grad [-4.387] [-0.401] [2.721] [2.514] [0.715]
(5.4)
[0.103]
Mom&Dad -0.067 -10.068 0.228 -1.432
Some or (0.238) (4.159) (0.231) (3.144)
-3.285
Grad Coil [-0.2361 [-2.3931 [0.956]
(0.188) (2.353)
Notes: Coefficient on price from regressions in MTF(first panel), YRBS (second and fourth panels), and
Natality data (third panel). Regressions include all of the controls shown in Tables2, 3, and 4, including full set of state and year fixed effects. Standarderrors (corrected for state/year clustering) in
parentheses; price elasticity in square brackets.Appendix Table 1: Means of Regulatory Variables in MTF
1 2thGraders 8th&0thGraders 8tli- 12thGraders
Accesslndex 11.91 11.69 11.76
(5.29) (5.46) (5.41)
CleanAir: 0.44 0.44 0.44
Private Workplace (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Clean Air: 0.73 0.71 0.72
Government Work (0.44) (0.45) (0.45)
Clean Air: 0.64 0.61 0.62
Restaurants (0.48) (0.49) (0.49)
Clean Air: 0.90 0.85 0.87
Schools (0.30) (0.36) (0.34)
Clean Air: 0.93 0.91 0.92
Other (0.25) (0.29) (0.28)
Number of Obs 106,539 230,126 336,665
Notes: From authors' tabulations of 199 1-1997 MTF restrictedsample data desribed in text. Standard
deviations in parentheses.